This article investigates the public discourses on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) across seven countries, to assess whether they support policy reforms. We argue that transformational discourses have at least one of these characteristics: they advocate specific policy reforms that address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation; take into account the potential risks of a REDD+ mechanism; go beyond technocratic solutions to reduce emissions; and explicitly challenge existing power relations that support drivers of deforestation. The evidence indicates the predominance of win-win storylines, a lack of engagement by state actors with debates on the potential negative socioeconomic outcomes of REDD+, and little attention to the drivers of deforestation. The article concludes that to achieve a shift toward transformational public discourse, reformist policy actors and the media need to engage dominant policy actors in debates about how to reduce pressure on the forest. This article investigates the extent to which public discourses on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)-the financial mechanism aimed at mitigating carbon emissions from forests-call for substantial
policy reforms that tackle the drivers of deforestation in seven tropical countries. We discuss new empirical evidence on the public discourse about REDD+ at the national level in seven countries and identify four characteristics of discourse that can support the transformational change necessary to address these drivers.
Under the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, decision 15/CP.19 reiterates the "importance of addressing drivers of deforestation and forest degradation." 1 In practice, REDD+ is taking shape through the deliberation of multiple policy actors at different scales, who are contesting the very understanding of what REDD+ should look like and achieve. 2 As with other environmental policies, the discourse, institutions, and politico-economic conditions of the host countries are what shape REDD+ policies. 3 National media provide a window into public discourses. The media reproduce and contribute to shaping policy debates. At the same time, policy actors use the media to signal their positions to policy opponents and potential allies, and to influence policy decisions. 4 Media reports also determine the salience of policy issues and contribute to popularizing REDD+ policy debates, affecting the engagement and opinions of the general public. 5 We investigated policy actors' public statements on REDD+ in the media to assess how these actors understand REDD+, which policy directions they privilege, and what emphasis they give to addressing the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.
Although discourse analysis has been used to assess how social change comes about, 6 few studies have investigated specifically which elements of a discourse support or indicate transformational change. We define transformational change as a specific shift in discourse, power relations, and deliberate actions away from business as usual and toward policy reforms that, in the case of REDD+, tackle the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. 7 This article contributes to advancing our understanding of discourses aimed at bringing about substantial transformation in the ways that we understand and devise solutions for environmental problems.
To begin with, the report outlines the main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, including what transformational change would entail in this context. We then explain our method for identifying and analyzing public discourses on REDD+, before presenting the results using Bäckstrand and Lövbrand's categorization of environmental discourses. 8 Finally, the conclusion identifies four characteristics that represent elements of a REDD+ discourse that would promote transformational change, and discusses the extent to which specific actor groups and specific national contexts promote such discourses.
Transformational Change and the Drivers of Deforestation and Forest Degradation REDD+ has been presented as a cost-effective option for mitigating climate change. Currently, REDD+ strategies, policies, and measures are being negotiated in many national policy arenas. Global research on deforestation indicates that the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation stem not just from forestry, but from multiple sectors; 9 hence, an effective national REDD+ strategy should involve multisectoral policy reforms. When analyzing the contributions of different sectors to deforestation, we can distinguish between direct and underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation. Despite differences among the seven countries analyzed, overall agricultural expansion (including large-scale, permanent, subsistence, shifting, and swidden agriculture and cattle ranching) is the main driver of deforestation, whereas logging (for commercial and fuel uses, both legal and illegal) is the main driver of forest degradation. Infrastructure development (transport extension and roads, expansion of settlements, and hydropower plants) is also a major direct cause of deforestation. The underlying causes relate to macroeconomic conditions (such as currency devaluations, trade policies, and fuel subsidies), weak governance (including poor enforcement of property rights, unclear land tenure, corruption, and rent-seeking), and other social conditions, such as the marginalization of local communities and the lack of access to land. 10 Moving from business-as-usual development trajectories to address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation requires substantive changes in discourse, incentives, and power relations. Such a process of transformational change requires changes in the discursive order. 11 In turn, this affects economic and governance frameworks and initiate policy reforms within and beyond the forestry sector to counter the direct and underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation. 12 Conversely, discourse that deflects attention from these drivers and the absence of political engagement to reform existing institutions and policies leads to "political inaction" and perpetuates business as usual. Disinterest in REDD+, resistance to change, and an inability or unwillingness to carry out policy reforms that upset the economic or political status quo can all lead to political inaction. 13 We can think of business-as-usual and 9. Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998. 10. Barraclough et al. 1995; Chomitz et al. 2007; Hosonuma et al. 2012; Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998; Kanninen et al. 2007 ; see Di Gregorio et al. 2012a for further differences among countries. 11. Foucault, 1971 . 12. Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012 . 13. Bell 1994 Brockhaus et al. 2014. transformational change as two extremes of a continuum, and of different discourses as being located somewhere along this continuum, depending on the extents to which they address the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation.
Media, Discourse, and Transformational Change
Environmental policy decisions, including those on REDD+, are negotiated primarily through argumentation or discourse. Discourse here refers to "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities." 14 Within a discourse, story lines act as metaphors that define and redefine environmental problems. 15 According to argumentative policy analysis, policy processes are therefore "a struggle for discourse hegemony in which actors try to secure support for their definitions of reality." 16 Thus, discourses frame REDD+ policy debates, limit what are considered reasonable options, and inform policy-making processes. In so doing, discourse constructs, and reproduces, or transforms power relations among REDD+ policy actors.
As policy-makers are defining national policies, a variety of discourses on REDD+ compete to determine the direction that REDD+ should take; these discourses diverge in terms of their priorities, level of focus (international, national), and consideration of different stakeholders. They portray different understandings of REDD+, which lead to distinct policy proposals. 17 The media play a critical role in this process. 18 A central function of the mass media is to identify and interpret environmental issues and act as a mediator between scientists, policy actors, and the public. 19 The media shape how policy is translated to the public and contribute to the placement of policy issues on the political agenda. 20 Policy actors also use the media to publicize their vision for REDD+ in order to influence public opinion and policy processes. For controversial policy issues, actors with high stakes in those issues often actively use the media to gather support. Media exposure also legitimizes policy actors and lets adversaries know the opinion of the opposition. 21 Thus, the media reflect, mediate, and reshape the specific frames represented in policy processes.
The literature on forest governance and climate change has identified a number of competing discourses. 22 Many of these discourse analyses draw on 14. Hajer 1995 , 44. 15. Forsyth 2003 . 16. Hajer 1995 Thompson and Rayner 1998. 17. Gupta 2012; Hiraldo and Tanner 2011; Streck 2010 . 18. Anderson 2009 Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Castree 2004 . 19. Boykoff 2009 Moser and Dilling 2007. 20. Bennett 1994; Crow 2010 . 21. Andsager 2000 . 22. Arts and Buizer 2009 Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Clapp and Dauvergne 2005; Di Gregorio et al. 2013; Forsyth and Walker 2008; Hiraldo and Tanner 2011. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand's classification of three broad discourses that derive from a study on tree planting and climate change. 23 This study most closely fits with our own topic and draws on the broader environmental discourse literature to identify the following meta-discourses: (1) ecological modernization, (2) green governmentality, and (3) civic environmentalism. 24 Each discourse contains a number of distinct threads, allowing for some overlap between them. Depending on the extent to which these discourses and their variations challenge the status quo, we can classify them along a continuum that moves from business as usual to transformational change. The position on this spectrum signals whether existing discourses are likely to support major policy reforms to realize REDD+ objectives (Figure 1 ). 25 The discourse of ecological modernization asserts the compatibility between economic growth and environmental protection and portrays liberal market approaches as leading to win-win outcomes. 26 It tends to focus on cost efficiency at the expense of other socioeconomic aspects, such a poverty and inequality. One characteristic of ecological modernization in the late 1980s was the reframing of environmental problems as global problems. 27 An important distinction within this discourse refers to weak and strong ecological modernization. Although both support market-based solutions, the weak variant is closer to business as usual than to transformational change, because it challenges neither existing institutions nor power relations. The strong variant, also called reflexive ecological modernization, takes into account the need for institutional and economic reform and for an open and participatory democratic decision-making process. 28 The second discourse, green governmentality, refers to the use of knowledgeincluding on the part of governments, scientific experts, and big business-to influence policy decisions. 29 Sound science here becomes the legitimizing instrument to justify specific technocratic policy solutions. Not unlike ecological modernization, it tends to depoliticize environmental problems. Closer to the 23. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006. 24. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Hajer 1995; Litfin 1994 . 25. Brockhaus and Angelsen 2012 . 26. Dryzek 2000 Hajer 1995 . 27. Mol 2001 . 28. Christoff 1996 . 29. Dean 2004 Jasanoff and Long Martello 2004. 
Figure 1
Environmental Discourse and Transformational Change transformational change end of the continuum than is weak ecological modernization, green governmentality can question whether business-as-usual practices can be compatible with REDD+ outcomes. Yet it tends to disregard the role of the underlying power structures that sustain business as usual. Reflexive green governmentality is a variant that is less hegemonic and more transformative. It recognizes local knowledge and democratic participation as being essential for effective and equitable environmental decision-making. Environmental experts that are conscious of the local context and are concerned with environmental justice and democratic participation often promote this discourse. Reflexive green governmentality questions the very power structures that support business as usual, and is thus more conducive to transformational change.
The third discourse, civic environmentalism, emphasizes pluralism and broad participation in decision-making, which should involve all stakeholders that have an interest in, and are affected by, relevant environmental problems and their solutions. It draws attention to the accountability and legitimacy of decision-making processes and is skeptical of the win-win rhetoric that suggests that market-based solutions alone can solve environmental problems. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand identified a reformist and radical variant of this discourse. The first variant supports cooperation between state, markets, and civil society, including public-private partnerships. 30 Reformist civic environmentalism is not necessarily transformative, and might at times be used as a rhetorical device to "talk the talk of change" but to take action only in so far as it does not upset prevailing power balances. The radical variant is more skeptical of the embedded power inequalities underlying partnerships and cooperation and tends to be more ecocentric than the reformist variant. 31 It calls for transformational change, not just because it recognizes the trade-offs between economic and ecological outcomes, but because it demands changes in the underlying power structure of society that perpetuates patterns of environmental degradation.
Methods
In this article, we investigate the statements about REDD+ attributed to specific policy actors in the national media in seven countries: Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Peru, and Vietnam. The country selection criteria were geographical diversity along the tropical forest belt, early engagement in REDD+ processes, and established partnerships for data collection with researchers in the country. The countries studied also involve a variety of different drivers of deforestation and of pressures on forests.
We analyze the opinion statements-also called "stances" 32 -of policy actors within national newspaper articles on REDD+. The period investigated covers January 2006-right after the 11th Conference of the Parties (COP11), 30. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Elliott 2002 . 31. Paterson 2000 . 32. Kockleman 2004 which first included avoiding deforestation in the UNFCCC policy agendathrough December 2010 (COP16). The analysis covers three newspapers in each country, which we selected according to their volumes of circulation and to represent a broad spectrum of political perspectives. To identify relevant articles, research teams searched for the key phrase "reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation," for parts of this phrase, and for the acronym "REDD" (using the relevant local language). Subsequent screening eliminated articles that only mentioned REDD with no further elaboration.
This process identified a total of 780 articles across all seven countries, which featured a total of 852 stances. Teams used a standardized codebook to capture a range of data from the articles and stances. They identified the stances of up to two actors for each media frame: the stance of one actor and, if present, a counterstance of another actor. 33 They transcribed the stances, or paraphrased them when the quotes were too long. Among a range of other data, the teams coded the names of the organization and of the person putting forward the stance, as well as the type of organization. The focus of this analysis is primarily on nonmedia policy actors, which we pooled into three main actor groups: (i) domestic state actors; (ii) foreign actors (comprising foreign governments, international organizations, NGOs, and research institutes); and (iii) domestic civil society and research institutes. Coders considered journalists to be the source of a stance only in editorial or opinion pieces, which accounted for a very small number of stances and so are grouped under the residual category "others" (together with other seldom-featured actor groups, including private business).
We analyzed the stances in two steps: first through an inductive and then through a deductive approach. We first used open coding to identify broader categories of stances that subsume a number of different stances under one conceptual theme. 34 We identified these broader frames inductively from the data, and pooled stances together under one stance category if they shared a common meta-discourse. This resulted in thirty-three unique stance categories, many (but not all) of which were found across multiple countries.
The second step of the analysis took a deductive approach and focused only on those stances associated with the three most frequent categories in each of the seven countries, for a total of fifteen different stance categories, comprising 615 individual stances. Coders classified each of these 15 stance categories within one of Bäckstrand and Lövbrand's three meta-discourses: ecological modernization, green governmentality, or civic environmentalism. 35 To assign a stance category, coders relied on a detailed description of (a) the definition and (b) a list of detailed characteristics of each of the three discourses derived from the literature and presented in the earlier section. Coders assigned each stance category to the discourse whose characteristics were dominant in that stance category. That said, 33. Di Gregorio et al. 2012b . 34. Benford and Snow 2000 . 35. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006 Bäckstrand and Lövbrand recognize areas of overlap between the different variants of the three discourse categories. 36 One of the limitations of our approach is that it does not allow for stances to be assigned to two discourses, meaning we are not able to capture such nuances, other than through general discussion and commentary on the results. Another aspect to keep in mind is that the media tend to overrepresent state actors and political topics and that our analysis supports this evidence, although there are differences across countries. 37
Results
In most countries, media coverage of REDD+ did not start until late 2007, which coincides with COP13 and the Bali Action Plan. After a subsequent decline, media coverage increased in frequency until December 2009, during COP15 in Copenhagen. The total coverage of REDD+ during this five-year period varied significantly across countries (Table 1) .
The majority of the stances reflect the ecological modernization discourse (56%), making it the dominant public discourse on REDD+ overall, as well as the most frequent in Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, and Peru. This is followed by civic environmentalism (34% overall), which is the dominant discourse in PNG, whereas only 10 percent of stances reflect green governmentality. Only in Vietnam is green governmentality the dominant discourse. The civic environmentalism discourse is absent in both Vietnam and Cameroon, and the same is true for the green governmentality discourse in Indonesia and Nepal ( The most common actor groups to put forward positions on REDD+ in the media between 2006 and 2010 were domestic state actors, followed by foreign actors and, finally, domestic civil society and research organizations. Collectively, these groups account for 90 percent of all stances in the media. Although domestic state actors have more voice in the media overall, the distributions of actors' statements differ across the three discourses. Foreign and state actors predominantly engage in the ecological modernization discourse, whereas domestic civil society and research organizations are more engaged in civic environmentalism. 38 However, each of the three actor groups-state, foreign, and domestic civil society/research organizations-is represented to some degree across all three discourses (Table 3 ). Below we explain in more detail the stance categories that we have classified under each of the three discourses, and we explore the actor groups associated with these stances (see Table 4 for the complete overview).
Ecological Modernization: The Win-Win Story Line
Of the fifteen most common stance categories, six align with ecological modernization. These include, in order of frequency, stances that emphasize the importance of incorporating forests into a global solution to climate change, the responsibility of the industrialized world, and the need for a carbon offset market mechanism to finance REDD+, followed by stances that claim that REDD+ will deliver co-benefits in addition to climate change mitigation, a win-win solution for conservation and development, and large amounts of funding.
Overall, these stance categories tend to represent broad, simplistic perspectives on REDD+, and typify win-win story lines. Although we might expect such positions to be more frequent during the early days of REDD+ (before more complex realities have fully emerged), this is not the case, since their frequencies are almost identical in 2007, 2009, and 2010. We can distinguish weaker and stronger variations of the ecological modernization discourse-for example, in the extent to which the discourse considers justice-related dimensions of environmental problems. In this case, stances calling for REDD+ funding to come Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, 68. from industrialized countries, and those anticipating co-benefits-which include, among other things, poverty reduction and improved governance-lie toward the strong end of the ecological modernization spectrum. The stance put forward more often than any other is one that calls for REDD+ (or forests) to be part of the global solution to climate change. It reflects the globalization of environmental problems, characteristic of the third wave of ecological modernization and its perspective that "we are all in the same boat." 39 This stance features among the top three most common stance categories in five of the seven countries studied. Consider, for example, the following statement, by Paulo Adário from Greenpeace Brazil: "It is essential to take the opportunity that Bali offers to include forest conservation in the discussions on climate change as one of the solutions to deal with it." 40 At the time, it was clear that the Bali meeting would bring forward the idea of a market-based solution to deforestation, and many organizations saw this as an opportunity to include emission reductions from forests among the global solutions to climate change.
The second most popular stance category claims that developed countries should finance REDD+. It incorporates global justice concerns related to who should fund REDD+ and implies that there are likely trade-offs between REDD+ and development objectives. Although not always explicit, the justifications for such support relate to the need for adequate compensation to REDD+ countries for their contribution to a global public good, the argument that REDD+ leads to foregone economic growth and associated development opportunities, and the perceived historical responsibility of industrialized nations for carbon emissions. Therefore, given the clear justice-related dimensions of such stances, they could be considered as leaning toward the strong end of the ecological modernization spectrum. Consider, for example, the following position, articulated by Indonesia's Minister of Forestry prior to COP13 in 2007: "For Kaban, as long as there is no commitment from developed countries to adopt REDD, global efforts to resolve climate change will remain unfair. 'If there are no ties for developed countries, developing countries will have no certainty, because the prop for developing countries is resources,' he said." 41 This stance acknowledges the potential for trade-offs between national development objectives and global climate change objectives. This international perspective on sustainable development and ecological democracy typifies Bäckstrand's definition of strong ecological modernization, which also overlaps with the civic environmentalism discourse, discussed later. The third most frequent stance category within the ecological modernization discourse (and fourth overall) consists of calls for carbon offset markets to finance REDD+. These statements were prominent in Brazil, Indonesia, and 41. Media Indonesia, October 24, 2007. PNG, and often relate to Annex 1 countries using offsets to avoid reducing their own emissions, something that has generated considerable controversy. In many cases, these stances call for linking REDD+ to carbon markets and assume that markets alone can solve the problem of global emissions. None of these stances mention potential risks, such as the loss of access to forest resources, unequal power, or access to information between sellers and investors, as well as other climate justice concerns. Such calls generally represent the weak ecological modernization discourse, because they promote market-driven strategies that sustain existing economic and development paradigms, while failing to question existing institutions and power structures that drive deforestation and forest degradation. Interestingly, this is the most controversial among our stance categories, with 38 percent of offset-related stances actually opposing REDD+ carbon offsets. Disagreement focused primarily on concerns with environmental justice or with the effectiveness of carbon markets in reducing emissions, as in the following 2007 statement from the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Brazil: "In the case of deforestation, Brazil does not agree with the premise of the carbon market, which enables the purchase of carbon credits for rich countries that pollute above the target set internationally." 42 All three main actor groups contribute to debates regarding the four most frequent stance categories (global solution, global financial support, carbon markets, and co-benefits). However, overall, state and foreign actors dominate the ecological modernization discourse, whereas domestic civil society and research institutes have far less representation (Figure 2) . Interestingly, no civil society or domestic research organization put forward stances anticipating that REDD+ would deliver a win-win solution for climate change and development.
Green Governmentality: The Technocratic Solution
In the context of REDD+ media debates, stances reflecting the green governmentality discourse appear in five of seven countries (Brazil, Cameroon, Peru, PNG, and Vietnam) . A total of five stance categories classified under green governmentality focus primarily on technical solutions to the distribution of domestic costs and benefits. These include, in order of frequency, calls for REDD+ to compensate for the opportunity cost of forest conversion, for the beneficiaries of environmental services to finance REDD+, and for increased technical and financial assistance.
The adoption of the economic discourse reflects the use of "eco-knowledges" that impact "the administration of life itself-individuals, populations and the natural environment." 43 In this case, experts use science as the legitimizing instrument to justify specific technocratic policy solutions. Calls for REDD+ to 42. O Estado de S. Paulo, December 5, 2007. 43. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006, 54. compensate for the opportunity costs of forest conversion in the Brazilian media suggest that new incentive structures need to be set in place to tackle deforestation. In this case, economic theory provides the justification for how REDD+ payments should be distributed. Consider, for example, the following statement from an economist from the Center for International Forestry Research: "When 80% of a serious environmental problem is caused by large landowners, then any solution will have to grant to this group some sort of compensation for losses." 44 While such a position addresses the need to tackle the drivers of deforestation, it privileges an economic rationale for deciding who should be compensated. Another characteristic of green governmentality-asserting the global power of the administrative state-is reflected in stances demanding stronger international leadership (Peru and PNG) and calls for countries to join multilateral efforts on REDD+ (Vietnam).
A reflexive vision of green governmentality, which embraces an attitude of humility and self-reflection and in which experts are conscious of the cultural assumptions they bring to their knowledge, is scarcely represented in the media. Overall, only 10 percent of all stances have been classified as green governmentality, reflecting a marginalization of science within REDD+ media coverage. 45
Figure 2
Actor Groups Expressing Ecological Modernization Stances 44. O Globo, May 25, 2010. 45. Babon et al. 2012; Cronin and Santoso 2010; Kengoum 2011; Khatri et al. 2012; Perla Alvarez et al. 2012. Domestic state actors are the most common actor group promoting the green governmentality discourse, putting forward half of all stances (Figure 3) . Foreign actors account for one third, and domestic civil society and research for one fifth. The latter group, dominated by research institutes, engaged with only two of the five stance categories, with civil society organizations having only a minor presence. State actors and domestic research organizations both engaged in debates regarding the opportunity costs of REDD+, indicating that state actors at times use scientific arguments to support their positions in the media, and that experts contribute to shaping public policy debates. State actors in Vietnam discussed domestic payments for environmental services (among the least prevalent stance categories) to gain support for a regulation that would place economic values on forest-related environmental services. Vietnam is the only country whose dominant discourse is green governmentality ( Table 2 ).
Civic Environmentalism: Reformist or Radical?
Of the fifteen most common stance categories, four were classified as reflecting the civic environmentalism discourse. These include, in order of frequency, stances that consider governance and institutional reform a prerequisite for REDD+, stances that call for increased respect for community rights and empowerment, those that warn of the risk that REDD+ funding and corruption will encourage exploitation and dispossession of local people, and those that call for REDD+ compensation to benefit poor and indigenous communities. These four stance categories represent a total of 193 individual stances, or just over a third of the stances analyzed. These stances call for increased inclusion of marginalized groups as part of the realization of sustainable development, and a number recognize the fundamental trade-offs between economic, ecological, and social sustainability, as well as between global aims and local needs. Stances related to civic environmentalism became more frequent in media coverage during the latter years (2009) (2010) of the period analyzed. Civic environmentalism was the dominant discourse in PNG (55% of stances) and was also relatively frequent in Nepal (42%), followed by Indonesia (26%) and Brazil (21%). At the other extreme are Cameroon and Peru, where media coverage on REDD+ did not feature any stances that promote civic environmentalism.
Of the four stance categories, by far the most frequent is one that sees governance and institutional reform as the key to REDD+ success. Such a position frequently encourages stronger cooperation and coordination among market, state, and civil society actors, and the establishment of good governance, rather than a radical change in institutional arrangements. It can, therefore, be described as a reformist, rather than a radical, discourse. Consider the following statement from Wiwiek Awiati from the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law during COP13 in 2007: "There are classic problems in the governance structure: corruption, poor institutional and intersectoral coordination, and legal uncertainty. If these are not resolved, then any mechanism applied will fail." 46 In this case, the stance acknowledges a range of systemic flaws in Indonesia's forestry sector that have contributed to the country's historically high levels of deforestation, and in doing so recognizes the challenges involved in implementing REDD+ at a national level. Still, such calls for improvements fall short of calling for radical reform of the political, economic, and social status quo.
Similarly, those stances that call for REDD+ funding to benefit poor and indigenous communities also represent reformist version of civic environmentalism, in that they do not necessarily question the underlying power structures that leave poor and indigenous communities marginalized.
Lying more toward the radical end of civic environmentalism are those stances that explicitly recognize the need for respecting local rights, inclusive decision-making, and empowering communities to capitalize on REDD+. Although we have already seen a number of stance categories that are related to local communities-for example, those concerned with distribution of benefits-this particular stance category goes further, to argue for a fundamental transformation of existing power structures. Consider, for example, the following statement from Dorothy Tekwie from Greenpeace: "Despite playing a leadership role internationally, the Government of PNG has not consulted with landowners and civil society and does not represent the people of PNG." 47 This stance highlights how national power relations can undermine the representation of weaker actors in international negotiation processes, and how this impacts on the legitimacy of REDD+ policy processes. Such stances call for greater inclusion of these groups in decision-making, and by doing so challenge existing power relations. Stances that warn of the risk that REDD+ funding, coupled with a culture of corruption that promotes the exploitation of local rights, reflect a similar questioning of national decision-making structures in the context of weak governance.
When we look at who is saying what, it is clear that domestic civil society actors are more frequently engaged in civic environmentalism than in other discourses, accounting for half of their total stances over the five-year period. These stances primarily advocate for governance reforms and community empowerment, but also include the few stances that refer to potential trade-offs between REDD+ and community benefits (Figure 4 ). Within civic environmentalism, state actors focus primarily on the need to establish new institutions for REDD+, but rarely call for radical change. Foreign actors account for just one fifth of the stances classified under the civic environmentalism discourse. When we consider the distinction between reformist and radical civic environmentalism, and the classification of only those stances linked to empowerment and exploitation as radical, the prominence of civil society becomes even more conspicuous, as does the absence of foreign actors.
Deadlock or Transformational Change?
Drawing from the evidence above on REDD+ public discourse, we argue that discourse promoting transformational change should show at least one of these four characteristics: (1) it clearly discusses specific policy reforms needed to Actor Groups Expressing Civic Environmentalism Stances address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation; (2) it takes into account the risks and trade-offs that a REDD+ mechanism might entail; (3) it goes beyond technocratic solutions to reduce emissions and includes the need for governance and institutional change; and (4) it explicitly challenges existing power relations that support business as usual.
We identify two central characteristics of public discourse in the REDD+ countries analyzed here. First, the stance categories within the two most dominant discourses (weak ecological modernization-the most common discourse in Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, and Peru-and reformist civic environmentalism, the most common in PNG) reveal the prevalence of public debates that avoid directly tackling the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Although a number of actors recognize the need for institutional and governance reform to support REDD+, the vast majority of stances fail to directly challenge business as usual. Just nine of the civic environmentalism stances discussed directly address the drivers of deforestation, such as legal and illegal logging and the conversion of forest to plantation agriculture or other land uses. These stances appeared almost exclusively in the Indonesian media. State actors put forth six of these stances-twice to suggest that they are tackling these issues already-and civil society organizations put forth the other three. The high frequency of reformist civic environmentalism stances in PNG coincided with reports in 2008 of questionable carbon projects and related corruption scandals, which compelled the government to respond to questions of climate change governance. 48 The second central characteristic is that, overall, discourses that call for transformational change-reflexive green governmentality and radical civic environmentalism-are the least prominent overall, although radical civic environmentalism is quite prominent in PNG, and to a lesser extent in Brazil. This indicates that very few public debates recognize the potential trade-offs between REDD+ and economic development goals, nor do they question the potential impacts of REDD+ on the socioeconomic conditions for local communities and their access to forest resources. Green governmentality stances offer predominantly technocratic solutions to deforestation and forest degradation, with few questioning existing institutional structures. Radical civic environmentalism stances go further in challenging business as usual: they address issues of power directly. For example, calls for increased participation of local people in decision-making processes on REDD+ and for the importance of the recognition of and respect for community and local rights to forest resources challenge the prevailing distribution of power in national REDD+ policy arenas and raise issues related to procedural and distributional justice. These stances question the underlying processes and power structures that maintain the dominance of established interests, including those behind the drivers of 48. Babon et al. 2012. deforestation and forest degradation. They are, however, conspicuously infrequent, accounting for just 8 percent of all stances on REDD+. Interestingly, stances on empowerment and community rights are most prominent within the two countries that have the strongest existing legal structures recognizing local rights to forest resources, PNG and Brazil. Such stances directly address three of the four key aspects of transformational change identified above: they highlight the risks and trade-offs for local communities, and they call for institutional reform and changes in power structures. With respect to the fourth aspect-tackling the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation-these stances address some of the underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation and the need to rebalance power structures, but they are less explicit about the need to address direct drivers.
When we compare the countries, weak ecological modernization is the dominant discourse in Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Nepal, and Peru, whereas in PNG civic environmentalism, and in Vietnam green governmentality, dominates. These differences reflect a stronger focus on governance and the need to empower local communities to effectively participate in REDD+ in PNG, and the extensive reliance on scientific and technical justifications for promoting REDD+ in Vietnam. Such a comparison also reflects the extent to which the respective national political systems are open to the participation of nonstate actors, as well as the freedom of the press. Domestic civil society primarily supports the civic environmentalism discourse, and statements from this actor group are completely absent from REDD+ media coverage within the two countries, Cameroon and Vietnam, where the press is labeled as "not free." 49
Conclusions
Our results support existing evidence that REDD+ has brought issues of forest governance to the forefront of international and national public policy debates. This prominence has led some authors to identify "forest governance" as a new stand-alone discourse within the REDD+ domain. 50 Nevertheless, the dominance of the weak ecological modernization discourse indicates that many REDD+ policy actors favor measurable market solutions and ignore possible socioeconomic trade-offs. In most countries, issues such as protecting local rights and participation remained marginal in national REDD+ public debates, at least until 2010. Evidence also suggests that even national public debates focus more on international REDD+ design and financing, as opposed to localized experimentation and learning. 51 Most notable in all seven countries is the absence of debate regarding the direct causes of deforestation and how to address them. State and business 49. Freedom House 2011. 50. Arts and Buizer 2009; Hiraldo and Tanner 2011. 51. McDermott et al. 2011. actors from the agricultural, forestry, infrastructure development, and mining sectors are very scarcely engaged in public debates on direct drivers. At present, the national public discourses on REDD+ show only a limited potential to move beyond concerns with forest governance and demand more substantive political action to transform current production and land use allocation processes that drive deforestation and forest degradation. We conclude that the dominant public discourse in REDD+ countries largely fails to question existing policies and practices in the sectors that drive business as usual. In order to achieve a shift in discourse that will support transformational change, reformist policy actors, as well as the media, need to engage dominant policy actors more explicitly in debates about how to reduce the pressures on forests from agricultural expansion, legal and illegal logging, mining, and infrastructure development.
